10.17889/E109502V1
Finan, Frederico
Ferraz, Claudio
Replication data for: Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
ICPSR Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
2010
10.1257/aer.101.4.1274
10.1257/aer.101.4.1274
1
We show that political institutions affect corruption levels. We use
audit reports in Brazil to construct new measures of political corruption
in local governments and test whether electoral accountability
affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We
find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can
get reelected. Mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27
percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives.
These effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less
access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment
is lower. Overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that
enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining
politician's corrupt behavior. (JEL D72, K42, O17)