10.17889/E111584V1
Kühn, Kai-Uwe
Cooper, David J.
Replication data for: Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion
ICPSR Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
2014
10.1257/mic.6.2.247
10.1257/mic.6.2.247
1
We study the effect of communication in an experimental game where
cooperation is consistent with equilibrium play if players share
an understanding that cheating will be punished. Consistent with
communication acting as a coordinating device, credible preplay
threats to punish cheating are the most effective message to facilitate
collusion. Promises to collude also improve cooperation. Credible
threats do not occur in a treatment with a limited message space
that permits threats of punishment. Contrary to some theoretical
predictions, renegotiation possibilities facilitate collusion.